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On November 4, 2010 a mass murder took place in the village of Kuschevskaya in the 
Krasnodar Region of the Russian Federation, population 35000. Intruders broke into the 
home of a local farmer, Server Ametov, killing his entire family as well as the two families 
visiting the Ametovs on the evening of the public holiday, the Day of Russian National 
Unity. A total of twelve people, including four little children, died of numerous stab wounds, 
burns or suffocation. Within a week three suspects were apprehended by the local police. Yet 
following pressure by the national media, the investigation of the case was pursued further, 
eventually culminating in the arrest on November 17 of two members of the District Council, 
Sergei Tsapok and Sergei Tsepovyaz, who were subsequently indicted as the organizers of 
the murder.  
 
After these arrests, the local authorities were overwhelmed by complaints about the crimes 
committed by the gang led by Tsapok and Tsepovyaz, going back as long as fifteen years and 
including racketeering, robbery, extortion and gang rape. Current membership of the gang is 
estimated at 400 people. According to the reports of investigative journalists (see e.g. 
Sokolov-Mitrich 2010, Lebedeva 2010), from 1998 the gang consolidated itself into a major 
agricultural holding company and gradually took control of the entire law enforcement 
apparatus in the district, including the police, the courts and the procuracy. Indeed, at the 
moment of his arrest, one of the suspects, Alexander Khodych, served as the Head of the 
Organized Crime Unit of the regional police and was responsible for combating ‘political 
extremism’. According to Attorney General Yuri Chaika, the ongoing investigation of the 
situation in the district has revealed that over 1500 crimes committed by the gang were 
covered up by local and regional police and the courts (Gazeta.ru Editorial 2011).  
 
This is not to say that the rule of this gang over Kushevskaya unfolded in isolation from 
regional and federal politics. Both Tsapok and Tsepovyaz served as members of the District 
Council elected on the ballot of the United Russia party, chaired federally by Prime Minister 
Putin and regionally by Governor Aleksander Tkachev, who is reported to have known 
Tsapok personally and to have praised his efficient business activities (Tirmastae 2010). 
Moreover, according to the investigation of the opposition movement Solidarity, Mr Tsapok 
was observed in attendance at the official inauguration of President Medvedev in 2008, an 
honour rarely bestowed on regional politicians or businessmen. Responding to the demands 
for his resignation, Governor Tkachev justified his unwillingness to resign by claiming that 
‘the situation, similar to that of Kushevskaya, where the police and the gangs work together, 
is typical for many districts of the region.’ (ibid.) Judging by the absence of comments on this 
case from either Prime Minister Putin or President Medvedev, as well as by the shift of media 
attention to other gruesome murders in neighbouring regions, Tkachev’s claim met with 




What are we to make of this reduction of the exceptionally gruesome murder to a ‘typical 
case’ in postcommunist Russia? What is this political order, in which the exception becomes 
the rule, not merely in the sense of playful logical paradoxes but in the sense of a brutal 
indistinction between law and crime, authority and violence, government and gang? From the 
beginning of the Putin presidency in 1999, contemporary Russian politics has been frequently 
interpreted in terms of the resurgence of ‘authoritarianism’ (see Anderson 2007, Baker and 
Glasser 2005, Gudkov 2001, Sakwa 2004, Truscott 2005). However, the precise nature of this 
authoritarianism has remained occluded by facile analogies with Soviet or Imperial eras, 
whereby the Putin era is understood either as a de-ideologised version of Soviet socialism 
(‘Stalinism-lite’) or a superficially ‘modernised’ resurgence of Russian autocracy. Both of 
these analogies are highly problematic insofar as they ignore the genealogical point of 
descent of the current regime in the process of the demise of the Soviet order and pay 
insufficient attention to the way the ruins of the old order form the basis of the new regime 
(cf. Magun 2008, Prozorov 2009, chapter 1). The fundamental feature of the postcommunist 
condition is its origin in the experience of the dissolution of Soviet socialism in the three 
senses of the political order, economic system and the Soviet state.  
 
It is in this sense that the postcommunist condition connects with the condition of colonialism 
that is the main focus of this book. In contrast to the practice of overseas colonisation, 
characteristic of European colonial powers, the Russian Empire emerged by mainland 
expansion into the Eurasian heartland and beyond into the Far East. As a consequence, while 
European colonial powers could be said to have colonies as external entities distinguished 
from the metropoly, in Russia the metropoly and its colonies could not be distinguished so 
easily, which resulted in important differences in the process of decolonisation. While, for 
example, Great Britain had an Empire that it could lose without ceasing to be what it was 
(though of course not remaining the same either), Russia was an Empire and decolonisation 
could therefore only be equivalent to its dissolution as an entity. This process of internal 
decolonisation, which began with the revolution of 1905 and reached its peak with the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, was gradually halted by the Bolshevik government itself, 
which managed to reconstitute almost the entire Empire under the veneer of the anti-
imperialist ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet period could therefore be understood 
as the temporary halting of the process of decolonisation through the full assumption of its 
ideology: during the 70 years of Soviet rule decolonisation was restrained in reality by being 
symbolically asserted in an unrestrained and hyperbolic celebration of ‘Soviet 
internationalism’. The demise of the Soviet order in 1991 entailed the resumption of the 
degradation of the Empire, which continues to this day; not merely in the areas of separatist 
conflicts in the North Caucasus (see King and Menon 2010), but also, in a no less violent 
manner, within whatever we understand as ‘Russia proper’, of which the village of 
Kushevskaya is, as we are told, a typical case. 
 
The understanding of the contemporary condition as the process of degradation of previous 
forms of rule, either Imperial or Soviet, provides us with a new perspective on contemporary 
‘authoritarianism’. While conventional accounts of authoritarianism, modelled on the theory 
of dictatorship (Schmitt 1994), attribute to authoritarian rule a plenitude (pleroma) of power, 
the full realisation of its forces, its unlimited unfolding, and so forth, our approach to 
postcommunism rather proceeds from the fundamental suspension, deactivation and 
inoperativity of power, its kenomatic state, which Giorgio Agamben associates with the state 
of exception (2005a, 48). This is the condition in which the legal order is in force but is 
deprived of all significance (1998, 51). ‘The state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether 
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constitutional or unconstitutional, commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a 
zone of anomie in which all legal determinations – and above all the very distinction between 
the public and the private – are deactivated’ (Agamben 2005a, 50).  
 
The application of Agamben’s political theory to the postcommunist condition yields both 
theoretical and empirical benefits. On the one hand, as we shall see, the postcommunist 
experience provides empirical support for many of Agamben’s claims that might appear 
excessively hyperbolic in contemporary Western contexts (cf. Laclau 2007, Passavant 2007). 
On the other hand, Agamben’s approach provides the analysis of postcommunism with the 
theoretical framework adequate for grasping the Russian state of exception other than in the 
merely negative sense of ‘disorder’, ‘instability’ or ‘illegality’, characteristic of Western 
analyses of postcommunist Russia during the 1990s. In this chapter we shall rely on 
Agamben’s political thought to elucidate the specificity of the contemporary mode of rule in 
Russia. In the following section we shall introduce the Russian concept of bespedel that 
emerged in the early 1990s to designate the postcommunist condition and serves as the best 
crosscultural translation of Agamben’s notion of the state of exception. We shall then proceed 
to the analysis of the transformation of the condition of bespedel in the Putin presidency, 
whereby the postcommunist anomie became ordered and stabilised by the regime that 
nonetheless remains within the anomic terrain – a paradoxical configuration that we shall 
term cratocracy. In the fourth section we shall elaborate this logic of the anomic management 
of anomie with reference to Walter Benjamin’s theory of baroque sovereignty. Despite its 
self-presentation as a constructive alternative to the ‘wild’ and ‘chaotic’ 1990s, the 
contemporary Russian regime persists in its nihilistic paradigm, all the more so as long as it 
keeps negating it. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the possibilities of overcoming 
this mode of power. 
 
 
Bespedel: Between Potentiality and Actuality 
 
Let us return to the gruesome scene of the Kushevskaya massacre. According to the 
investigation of Argumenty i Fakty, the information on the implication of the Tsapok gang in 
the murder was passed to the authorities by the leaders of the underworld of the neighbouring 
city of Rostov, who were dismayed by the fact that four children, including an infant, had 
been brutally murdered in this incident (Artemov 2010). While murder as such is generally 
held to be an acceptable instrument of conflict resolution in the underworld, the murder of 
children falls outside the informal code of conduct, which is called ‘ponyatia’ (literally, 
‘concepts’). If something is done ‘not according to the concepts’ (ne po ponyatiam), then the 
situation justifies exceptional measures in response. The cooperation of criminal gang leaders 
with the police investigation is an example of one such exceptional response, not usually part 
of the criminal code of conduct.  
 
This expression from the underworld slang is also well suited for attempts to theorise the 
postcommunist condition. Various approaches to Russian postcommunism, from liberal 
transitionalism to cultural traditionalism (Prozorov 2009, ch 1), face a perpetual problem of 
the inapplicability of the conventional conceptual apparatus of social sciences to 
postcommunist Russian reality, which seems bent on behaving ‘not according to the 
concepts’. As a result, the postcommunist condition is routinely conceptualised in a purely 
negative manner, as the lack of democracy, absence of solidarity, insufficient participation, 
weakness of tradition, and so forth. Indeed, it is easy to see how familiar concepts work 
poorly in grasping a situation like the one in Kushevskaya, which as we recall, was 
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pronounced ‘typical’ by the authorities. The familiar oppositions between the public and the 
private, the legal and the illegal, the norm and the exception appear inoperative in the 
territory ruled by an organised criminal gang that includes the Head of the Organized Crime 
Unit, which exercises its authority through a combination of the selective use of legal 
mechanisms by corrupt police and courts and arbitrary violence, including rape and murder of 
apparently random victims? Can the Tsapok gang be distinguished from the postcommunist 
state reconstituted and run by Prime Minister Putin and how is this distinction 
phenomenologically accessible to the residents of Kushevskaya? As a result of this collapse 
of all distinctions we are resigned to the construction of oxymorons such as ‘mafia state’, the 
designation of Russia in the US diplomatic cables made publicly available in 2010 by 
Wikileaks (see Harding 2010). However, insofar as this term conflates what we hold to be 
distinct and even opposite entities, its operation only reproduces a negative conceptualisation, 
whereby a mafia state is neither a proper ‘mafia’ nor a proper ‘state’. Accessible only in the 
mode of what it is not, the postcommunist condition is mystified even further. 
 
Our solution to this problem, guided by Agamben’s refusal of mystifying and mythologising 
tendencies in the history of law and religion (1998, 71-80; 2011, 8-17), is to take as the sole 
point of departure in conceptualising postcommunism the sheer fact of its being ‘not in 
accordance with the concepts’. Evidently, this does not mean the refusal of conceptualisation 
on the part of the analyst. On the contrary, we shall take as our point of departure the concept, 
immanent to postcommunist Russian history, which refers to precisely this condition of 
‘inaccordance with the concepts’, the indistinction prior to all distinctions. In the Russian 
context such a paradoxical concept of ‘inaccordance with the concepts’ is readily available to 
us in the form of a late-Soviet neologism, ‘bespedel’. 
 
As opposed to a neutral noun ‘bespedelnost’ with the same denotation of ‘limitlessness’, the 
abridged form ‘bespedel’ entered the popular lexicon in the late 1980s with a sharply 
negative connotation. Originally this term emerged as part of the criminal slang, in which it 
referred to the practices that violated the tacit rules of conduct in the ritualised hierarchical 
structure of the Soviet underworld. It is important to stress that in its original meaning 
bespedel does not designate ‘illegality’ per se and is thus entirely distinct from the 
corresponding Russian term ‘bezzakonie’, which is literally translated as ‘without-law’ and 
refers to acts or phenomena that violate established legal norms or statutes. In contrast, 
bespedel designates not the illegality of acts but rather their inaccordance with the tacit and 
informal norms that may well be themselves illegal. For instance, it is common for drivers 
stopped for speeding or other traffic violations to pay a bribe directly to the police officer 
rather than go through the trouble of paying the fine through official channels and having the 
violation registered in one’s record. According to the tacit ‘concepts’, the bribe in question 
must be lesser than or equal to the official fine. It is only when the policeman demands a 
greater amount, frequently threatening to pin additional violations on the hapless driver, that 
we leave the domain of illicit regularity and enter the perilous zone of bespedel, where no 
rules apply.  
 
Thus, bespedel refers to a meta-illegality or second-degree anomie that is characterised by the 
radical impossibility of adjudication. In the late-Soviet and postcommunist period bespedel 
became the favourite term to describe the socioeconomic disorder and rampant criminality 
that characterised the later years of Perestroika and particularly the ‘market reforms’ of the 
Yeltsin presidency. In various enunciative contexts, bespedel may refer to the utter disrespect 
for traditional authorities, the acceptability of physical violence in the resolution of conflicts, 
the politicians’ disregard for public opinion, the radical reversal of moral values, the 
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disappearance of ethical standards in professional practices, the domination of private 
entrepreneurship by criminal protection rackets, and so forth. 
 
The limitlessness of the postcommunist sociopolitical field is a direct effect of the threefold 
collapse of the Soviet political system, the economy and the state. Once the Soviet order 
unravelled, revealing not only the contingency of its own foundations but rather the radical 
contingency of every positive order, all ordering principles - be they Soviet or anti-Soviet - 
were rendered inoperative, depriving social praxis of any limitations. In other post-
revolutionary contexts, including Central and East European postcommunism, this 
limitlessness whose momentary eruption is the feature of any genuine revolution, was quickly 
effaced by the institution of a new hegemonic delimitation that took the form of a ‘return to 
Europe’ and the institutional process of NATO and EU accession. A similar installation of 
limits took place in the Central Asian republics of the former USSR, albeit in an explicitly 
anti-democratic and traditionalist manner. In contrast to other post-Soviet states whose 
newfound independence enabled a relatively quick return to order, for Russia the 
postcommunist condition entailed the resumption of post-Imperial decolonisation, with its 
attendant fragmentation, disintegration and destabilisation, whereby all attempts at installing 
a positive form of postcommunist order appeared to be thwarted in advance. As we have 
argued in detail in the Ethics of Postcommunism (2009, chapters 2-4), the collapse of the 
Soviet order did not merely result in the demise of one historical project among others but 
rather illuminated the contingency of the historical dimension as such. This deactivated from 
the outset any attempt to replace the project of ‘building socialism’ by the alternative project 
of ‘building capitalism’, ‘building the Russian nation’, or other forms of reconstructive 
transformation. It is the very idea of building a social order that has been rendered inoperative 
in the postcommunist condition, hence the lingering of the limitlessness of bespedel. 
 
During the early years of postcommunism the lament about bespedel would typically 
proclaim that ‘everything has become possible’, with a melancholic caveat ‘but not for us’. In 
his analysis of Russian postcommunism as a ‘minimal’ or ‘negative’ revolution, Artemy 
Magun (2008, 66-84) has demonstrated that lamentation, melancholy and mourning are the 
dominant moods of the post-revolutionary period. These function as the symptoms of the 
failure of the revolution to fully actualise its negative potential, which could take place only 
through the complete annihilation of the symbolic order of human society as such. Since such 
annihilation does not take place and every revolution is, in this sense, a failure, its aftermath 
entails nothing other than the materialisation of its negativity in our everyday existence as 
simultaneously an experience of radical liberty and utter disempowerment. Bespedel is both a 
dizzying experience of freedom from all limitations and a nauseating experience of the 
impossibility of freedom as a practice; it signifies both a wide expanse of potentiality for 
being whatever one wants to be and a sense of actual powerlessness in the face of the reign of 
brute force and universal corruption. In this experience, potentiality and actuality are 
radically separated, whereby the absence of all limits bars and forecloses the actualisation of 
the very possibilities enabled by it.  
We may therefore conclude that bespedel is ultimately the best Russian translation for what 
Agamben terms the ‘state of exception’ (2005a). Indeed, this notion immediately recalls two 
of the most controversial paradigmatic figures in Agamben’s work: homo sacer and the 
Muselmann (1998, 1999) and also permits us to differentiate between them, contrary to the 
frequent conflation of these figures in the interpretations of Agamben’s work (cf. Laclau 
2007, DeCaroli 2007). Insofar as bespedel designates the dissolution of all structures of 
authority and the inoperative status of all norms, its subjects evidently inhabit the state of 
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exception, in which they are all homini sacri, beings abandoned by the sovereign power that 
withdrew from the social realm after the demise of the Soviet Union. Moreover, given the 
rampant criminality of early postcommunism, its subjects indeed dwelled in the harrowing 
condition of being ‘capable of being killed with impunity’. And yet, like the objects of what 
Agamben calls the ‘ban’ (Agamben 1998, 104-111), who have undergone a ‘civil death’ and 
are ostracised or banished from the community, postcommunist subjects may also experience 
their banishment as a matter of freedom, an extreme potentiality that has done away with any 
positive authority. It is this potentiality, which may of course be completely barred from 
empirical actualisation, that ultimately differentiates homo sacer from the Muselmann, the 
utterly desubjectified inhabitant of the camp (see Agamben 1999, 41-86; Agamben 1998, 
166-180). For the Muselmann, confinement rather marks the withdrawal of all potentiality in 
the materialisation of the impossible as ‘absolute necessity’ (Agamben 1999, 148). From this 
perspective, the condition of bespedel must be rigorously distinguished from Agamben’s 
figure of the camp, which, after all, is defined precisely by the limits that bespedel lacks. 
At the same time, it would certainly be facile to celebrate the postcommunist condition in 
terms of liberation from the camp-like condition of Soviet ‘totalitarianism’. In the condition 
of bespedel, freedom exists as a paradoxical conjunction of extreme potentiality and utter 
impossibility, whereby the absence of limits to the practice of freedom consumes the 
experience of freedom itself in the perpetual deferral of its actualisation. As Agamben 
remarked, ‘nothing is bitterer than a long dwelling in potential’ (Agamben 1995, 65). It is this 
bitter dwelling in the gap between potentiality and actuality that defines the postcommunist 
condition. 
 
Cratocracy: The Stabilisation of Bespedel  
Is there a way out of this bitter experience? A self-evident solution to the problem of extreme 
potentiality posed by the condition of bespedel would consist in its gradual overcoming 
through the institution of a hegemonic project that actualises certain of its infinite 
possibilities and proscribes others. This might proceed in the name of some teleological end-
state of a ‘bright future’, in which all potentiality is expected to find fulfilment. The Russian 
politics of the 1990s was marked by a veritable explosion of such soteriological solutions to 
the problem of bespredel, none of which was able to attain the hegemonic status they attested 
to (see Prozorov 2008). Nonetheless, it is impossible to deny the widespread temptation in the 
early 1990s to escape bespedel by a retreat into the security of a teleological project, even if 
the latter could only be conceivable as a simulacrum.  
It is from this perspective that we must understand the phenomenon of Putinism as a highly 
effective, if also uncanny, solution to the problem of bespedel. The reason why Putinism 
triumphed over all its adversaries across the ideological spectrum (socialists, liberals and 
nationalists) is that its design for overcoming bespedel did not involve the imposition of any 
positive ideological hegemony, but rather invoked a promise of stabilisation devoid of 
substantive content that we have elsewhere addressed in terms of ‘absolute conservatism’ 
(Prozorov 2008, 220-222). While the neoliberal ‘conservative’ reformers vainly attempted to 
conserve what was not yet created (the liberal order), and the nostalgic left strove to conserve 
what no longer existed (the Soviet system), Putinism simply conserves what there is, i.e. the 
ruins of the Soviet order. Putinism thereby institutes an apparently immutable system, which 
carries no historical project but for this very reason functions very effectively in a society 
founded on the experience of the contingency of all historical teleologies. 
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This is what distinguishes Putinism from all hitherto known forms of authoritarianism of the 
left and the right, which limit themselves to the repertoire of some ideological orientations 
that are deployed against others in the manner of a Schmittian friend-enemy distinction. In 
terms of Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) theory of populism, which he presents as a transcendental 
structure of the political, politics necessarily involves the process of articulation of particular 
demands into equivalential chains around ‘empty signifiers’, whose polysemy permits them 
to serve as quilting points for diverse and frequently divergent values, interests or 
ideologems. Yet, every process of articulation must presuppose the existence of signifiers that 
do not enter the equivalential chain, but rather function as the ‘other’ or even the ‘enemy’ of 
the newly constituted political unity. Thus, in the late 1980s the anti-communist movement in 
the Soviet Union was constituted by the articulation around the empty signifier ‘democrats’, 
personified by Boris Yeltsin, of such disparate political identities as monarchists, neoliberals, 
anarchists, social democrats and environmentalists, whose unity was momentarily enabled by 
their opposition to all things ‘communist’. The indisputable advance of Putinism over this 
logic of populism is precisely its utter indifference to the contents of ideological maxims, 
which are incessantly combined into most bizarre constellations without any need for the 
construction of the antagonistic frontier and the determination of the ‘other’. What Putinism 
achieves is something that is barely possible to grasp in the terms of Laclau’s theory:  a 
situation of total equivalence of diverse demands or, better, their radical indistinction.  
And yet, this deactivation of ideology in the reign of pure stability entails that what Putinism 
conserves must be identical to what it claims to overcome. Insofar as the Putin regime does 
not introduce any positive ideological content, what its policy of stabilisation achieves is 
logically nothing other than the stabilisation of this ruinous scene of bespedel itself. What 
was decried, tolerated or barely survived in the 1990s as a ‘transitional moment’, an 
exceptional condition on the way to something positive or substantial, became in the Putin 
presidency reinscribed as the substance of contemporary Russian social life as such, as all 
there is. In this manner, corruption, social inequality or police brutality became normalised as 
stable forms of life, without of course losing any of their negativity. Thus, the Putinite 
negation of the negativity of the post-historical condition of the 1990s does not lead to any 
affirmation whatsoever. Despite its self-presentation as a positive and constructive alternative 
to the ‘wild’ and ‘chaotic’ 1990s, the contemporary Russian regime persists in its nihilistic 
paradigm, all the more so as long as it keeps negating it. Moreover, in its ‘stabilised’ form 
bespedel paradoxically ends up a bounded terrain, a limited zone of limitlessness that begins 
to approximate Agamben’s figure of the camp, insofar as the perils of abandonment are 
multiplied by the impossibility of flight. The Kushevskaya village, in which arbitrary rule and 
random violence coexisted for over a decade with the rhetoric of stabilisation under the aegis 
of Putin’s United Russia party, is a paradigm of this paradoxical situation, in which the sole 
substance of order is disorder itself.  
 In the late 19th century, the period of the accelerated capitalist development in Russia, 
marked by revolutionary societal dislocations, the conservative philosopher Konstantin 
Leontiev famously suggested that ‘Russia must be frozen in order not to rot’. The solution to 
the problem of the dissolution of the Empire, i.e. the ‘internal decolonisation’ of Russia, was 
found in the suspension of every immanent social process and the reign of pure synchrony. 
Yet, as every variant of conservatism eventually finds out to its disappointment, what ‘must 
be frozen in order not to rot’ has always already begun to rot, hence the anxiety about its 
‘conservation’, which would hardly arise, were the phenomenon in question safe in its proper 
and authentic existence. Reconstituting what is already destitute, the Putin regime remains as 
nihilistic as Yeltsin’s in its evacuation of all historical meaning from the sphere of politics, 
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yet, unlike the Yeltsin presidency, ventures to order the field of bespedel through the 
proliferation of purely ritualistic manifestations of authority that maintain a semblance of 
order amid anomie. Rather than overcome the anomie of bespedel through the institution of a 
new nomos, the Putin regime exemplifies the uncanny rule of anomie over anomie, the 
attempt to manage the condition of bespedel to its advantage. Rather than ward off the 
dissolution of the Empire in the manner of the Pauline katechon, this regime claims its 
sovereignty over the scene of post-imperial degradation and enacts this sovereignty by 
persevering in this ruinous scene of Russia’s internal decolonisation. The task of the regime 
is not to overcome the post-imperial decay, fragmentation and disintegration but to make this 
very condition and its own standing in it permanent. 
It is in this context that we may understand the reign of violence in the Kushevskaya 
village as the paradigm of the management of anomie. From the beginning of the Putin 
presidency numerous commentators have argued that the Putinite mode of rule, devoid of any 
ideological or developmental project, consists simply in the reign of power as such, of power 
as brute force rather than authority. In April 2007 Putin’s former economic advisor Andrei 
Illarionov published an article entitled ‘The Force Model of the State’ (Illarionov 2007), in 
which he argued that the current regime is sustained by the use of brute violence, unlimited 
by any legal mechanisms. Similarly, Mikhail Delyagin (2007) has described the existing 
regime as a ‘force oligarchy’ (silovaya oligarkhia) that comprises the representatives of the 
repressive apparatus of the state who control the key sectors of Russia’s economy and are 
more prone to the direct recourse to violence than the ‘commercial’ oligarchy of the 1990s. In 
a less sensationalist manner, the same thesis is presented in the studies of Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya (2005), which demonstrate the tendency towards the composition of the 
Russian political and business elite from the representatives of law enforcement and security 
services as well as Vadim Volkov’s (2002) work on the formation of the postcommunist elite 
from the representatives of what was once known as ‘organised crime’ or, in Volkov’s 
terminology, ‘violent entrepreneurship’.  
The elevation of extra-juridical violence to a distinct ‘model’ of the state in these analyses 
enables the criticism of the Putin regime from the conventional perspective of an apparently 
‘normal’ state, founded on rule of law, constitutional principles, etc. Yet, there is no such 
thing as a ‘normal’ state that does not contain at its foundation the state of exception that 
alone gives it access to its object, that is, the life of its subjects. As Agamben (2005a, 84-88) 
has demonstrated, the state of exception is the ‘secret ark’ at the foundation of every state. 
Thus, the difference of the Putin regime from Western liberal democracies or, for that matter, 
the Soviet Union does not amount to a separate alternative ‘model’ but rather consists in the 
reduction of state power to its pure form, whereby positive governmental interventions into 
social life are rendered inoperative and all that remains is the ceremonial display by power of 
its own power that endlessly glorifies its potentiality of self-cancellation through recourse to 
brute force. In the absence of any positive project in the post-Soviet condition of the 
resumption of internal decolonisation, authority in postcommunist Russia manifests itself 
through a redoubling of its own power, as the power of those who hold power or, to use 
Andrei Fursov’s (1991) fortunate neologism, as cratocracy. Thus, rather than view the 
contemporary regime in terms of plenitude of power in its sovereign majesty, we should 
rather approach it as an effect of a radical kenosis of power, whereby it is split between its 




The Intrigant: Postcommunist Anomie and Baroque Sovereignty 
Uncanny as this mode of power might appear, its paradigm has actually been developed by an 
author whose influence on Agamben’s work cannot be overestimated – Walter Benjamin, 
whose theory of baroque sovereignty resonates strikingly with the postcommunist state of 
exception. Similarly to our analysis of the logic of bespedel in terms of the suspension of the 
historical process in the aftermath of the demise of socialism, Benjamin’s point of departure 
in his Origin of German Tragic Drama is the transformation in the perception of history 
during the Baroque period, whereby the eschatological dimension was blocked and the 
historical world was perceived as ‘nature deprived of grace’ (Benjamin 2003, 81). In this 
world of history-as-nature, transcendence is emptied of any possible content but remains 
present as an ‘ultimate heaven’, a ‘vacuum’ that is capable of one day ‘destroying the world 
with catastrophic violence’ (ibid.). It is from this perspective that we should understand 
Benjamin’s minimal yet profound amendment to Carl Schmitt’s (1985, 5-15) famous 
definition of sovereignty as the decision on the exception: ‘the baroque concept emerges from 
a discussion of the state of emergency and makes it the most important function of the prince 
to exclude this’ (Benjamin 2003, 81). While Schmitt’s sovereign consummates his 
sovereignty by deciding on the exception and thus bringing it into being in the manner of the 
miracle, Benjamin’s baroque sovereign is rather faced with a more prosaic yet also more 
difficult task of excluding the exception that has always already taken place and even 
‘become the rule’. Similarly, as we have argued, the political rationality of Putinism in 
contemporary Russia is only intelligible as an attempt to stabilise one’s standing and 
authority in the general state of exception coextensive with the entire social order, the 
limitlessness of bespedel.  
The evacuation of the eschatological dimension ruptures the systematic analogy that 
Schmitt’s political theology established between the sovereign and God (Schmitt 1985, 36-
52): ‘However highly he is enthroned over subject and state, his status is confined to the 
world of creation; he is the lord of creatures but he remains a creature’ (Benjamin 2003, 85). 
To the extent that the sovereign is ‘itself a creature’, it is necessarily itself contaminated by 
the general anomie of ‘history deprived of grace’. Hence, the only possible task of the 
baroque sovereign is to persevere in its own being without being consumed by the very state 
of exception it is always already caught up in. By the same token, the postcommunist regime 
in the Putin presidency is best grasped as the anomic management of anomie, whereby 
exceptional measures of the kind associated with the condition of bespedel are deployed to 
order and stabilise this condition itself.  
Benjamin introduces three figures of power, the relations between which permit us to 
understand the transformation of sovereign power in the Baroque age. Faced with the task of 
self-preservation in the general state of anomie, the sovereign may seek to accumulate as 
much power as possible and in this manner becomes a tyrant, who acts on the basis of hubris, 
as a ‘deranged creation’, ‘erupting into madness like a volcano and destroying himself and 
his entire court’ (ibid., 70). Falling victim to the ‘disproportion between the unlimited 
hierarchical dignity with which he is divinely invested and the humble estate of his humanity’ 
(ibid.), the fearful tyrant is at the permanent risk of turning into a pitiful martyr. There is only 
one possibility to exit the endless oscillation between tyranny and martyrdom in Benjamin’s 
conceptual constellation, which consists in the transformation of the sovereign into the 
intriguer (Intrigant). Contrary to the tyrant, who violently tries to exclude the state of 
exception and falls victim to it, the intriguer - usually represented in the baroque drama by 
the servant to the prince - is perfectly aware that the state of exception is all there is, and 
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rather than vainly attempt to exclude it, tries to make use of it through ceaseless plotting and 
scheming: ‘Baroque drama knows no other historical activity than the corrupt energy of 
schemers’ (ibid., 88). While the Schmittian sovereign enacts its transcendence through the 
decision on the exception, the intriguer renounces all transcendence in favour of a purely 
immanent governance by staging plots and conspiracies, which, in accordance with the 
general reduction of history to nature, are grounded in the ‘anthropological, even 
physiological knowledge’ of human beings (ibid., 95). Evidently, this immanentist modality 
of rule is the only possible one in the postcommunist condition, which permits us to 
understand the process of depoliticisation that began in Russia almost immediately after the 
demise of the Soviet order, when the process of internal decolonisation was resumed, 
rendering inoperative all sovereign transcendence and unleashing the immanent forces of 
schemers. Unwilling to risk becoming martyrs in the case of failure of their hubristic claims 
to tyranny, the entire Russian political elite, from President Yeltsin downwards, transformed 
politics into a technology of scheming, which in the Putin presidency was perfected to a 
degree unprecedented in modern history. While in the early 1990s we observed the diffuse 
proliferation of charlatans exploiting the societal shock of bespedel (astrologists, messiahs, 
urinotherapists, faith healers, impostors, pyramid schemers, etc), the stabilisation of bespedel 
entails the concentration of ‘corrupt energy’ in the figure of the sovereign. 
 
Conclusion 
The understanding of the postcommunist mode of rule in terms of the baroque-like 
degradation of transcendent sovereignty into immanent intrigue in the anomic space of 
bespedel poses numerous problems for rethinking the possibilities of resistance to this form 
of power. Nothing would be easier than thinking up an alternative form of nomos (liberal, 
socialist, nationalist or any combination thereof) to oppose the anomie which the Putin 
regime conserves and manages, yet nothing would be less effective, as countless oppositional 
groups and movements (Another Russia, National Assembly, Solidarity, Party of Popular 
Freedom) have discovered to their disappointment. However, it would be a mistake to infer 
from these failures the societal support for the existing regime. What we observe is rather a 
lack of support for any project that seeks to exit the condition of bespedel by the imposition 
of a new hegemonic historical task, to whose realisation in the future one’s existence must be 
sacrificed in the present. Any oppositional project that ventures to overcome the state of 
bespedel through the construction of an alternative order is likely to be met with societal 
indifference.  
Nonetheless, this indifference must not become the object of vacuous moralising that blames 
those caught up in the state of exception for insufficient resistance to it. Instead, we must 
recognise that the pathway out of anomie into a new nomos is not merely empirically 
problematic but conceptually inconsistent. As long as we search for the way out of bespedel 
through the negation of its negativity, we are bound to remain within its nihilistic 
coordinates: nothing is more nihilistic than a negation of nihilism (Esposito 2008, 45-76). 
The passage from anomie to nomos is exactly the same passage that leads from nomos to 
anomie. Reversing the direction merely ensures that we remain literally in the same place and 
the possibility of a relapse back into anomie remains safe, as the residents of Kushevskaya 
who have lived through over a decade of campaigns for the rule for law and against 
corruption know all too well. In the case of the postcommunist bespedel we are not dealing 
with an externally induced disorder that could be eliminated by a return to order, grounded 
either in the depths of tradition or in rational design, but with the actualisation of the 
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potentiality at work in any form of constituted order. If, as we have seen, anomie is not the 
opposite of the nomos but is inscribed within it as the potentiality of its self-suspension that 
remains amenable to management by scheming and intrigue, then there is little sense in 
fighting anomie with any nomological politics.  
Nor is it possible to evade the condition of bespedel by retreating from the degraded and 
inoperative nomos into a pre-nomological state of nature, since in the condition of bespedel 
history merges irreparably with nature and there is no longer a possibility to distinguish 
between the two (Agamben 2005a, 87-88; 1998, 188). It is at this point of apparent impasse 
that Agamben deploys his characteristic move of finding the possibility of redemption in the 
conditions of utmost hopelessness and despair. In accordance with Hölderlin’s famous 
phrase, Agamben finds ‘saving power’ where we are accustomed to see only danger 
(Agamben 1998, 187-188; 1991, 108. See also Prozorov 2010). We have no hope of evading 
the state of exception by opting for the uncontaminated normativity of bios or the naturalism 
of zoe. What we can do, however, is appropriate this condition for a different, profane use, 
whereby anomie stops being the privilege of the sovereign, authorising its recourse to 
violence, but is rather extended to the entire domain of social praxis (see Agamben 2007, 73-
92; 2005b, 26-29, 134-137).  
This reappropriation of anomie, whose logic in the postcommunist context we have analysed 
elsewhere, resonates with Benjamin’s notion of the ‘real state of exception’ which differs 
from the sovereign state of exception in its severing all ties with the law and the state form, 
even the purely formal ties that we have described in terms of the cratocratic management of 
anomie through scheming and violence: ‘Only if it is possible to think the Being of 
abandonment beyond every idea of the law (even that of the empty form of law’s being in 
force without significance) will we have moved out of the paradox of sovereignty towards a 
politics freed from every ban’ (Agamben 1998, 59). In this appropriation of abandonment, 
bespedel no longer functions as the condition of separation and disempowerment but is rather 
the site of potential emancipation that, moreover, is entirely of our own making as the effect 
of the dissolution of Soviet socialism. The extreme potentiality that characterises bespedel 
must therefore not be effaced, minimised or regulated, but rather brought wholly into 
actuality as the concrete experience of freedom (see Agamben 1991, 84-98, 1995, 73-82).  
In this process of reappropriation, the postcommunist state must be approached neither as a 
privileged object of struggle nor as the omnipotent obstacle to emancipation but simply as 
one among many hazards that surround us in this limitless domain in which no norms may be 
expected to apply. Precisely because bespedel is defined by the suspension of every norm, 
any elaboration of the logic of its reappropriation in normative terms is entirely beside the 
point. What is needed and presently lacking in postcommunist Russia is rather an immanently 
developed form of practical reason, a phronesis for bespedel that seeks to evade the powers 
of the schemers that presently manage it. Only by out-scheming the schemers of the state of 
exception will it become possible to transform what is now an anomic zone of abandonment 
and disempowerment into the site of emancipatory social praxis: ‘The prison must imprison 
itself. Only thus will the prisoners be able to make their way out’ (Agamben 1995, 99). While 
Agamben’s theory firmly establishes the possibility of this mode of emancipation, it is neither 
a matter of historical necessity nor of yet another historical project but remains entirely 
contingent on the concrete practices that apply the logic of anomie to anomie itself, thereby 
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